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Abstract
This article proposes a new philosophical approach to fundamental human rights 
to clarify the differences between controversial cultural practices and violations 
of rights, through a new reading of the concept of human dignity developed by 
Immanuel Kant. This investigation suggests the adoption of an ethical concept 
of fundamental human rights with the aim of reconciling relativistic theories, 
which are opposed to the universal respect for these rights, with the universalist 
positions that advocate the unconditional observance of these rights in all 
cultures. The compromise between these two positions is possible, using Kant’s 
theory, through an understanding of fundamental human rights as a subspecies 
of the genus human rights, which is responsible for maintaining human dignity at 
a fundamental level and protecting individuals against any form of objectification 
or reduction of their status as subjects with rights. Thus, the moral peculiarities 
of each culture are respected and recognized as individual forms of human 
achievement, provided that they do not imply the reduction of the individual to 
a mere instrument or object.  
Key words: Fundamental Human Rights, Universalism, Relativism, Multiculturalism, 
Human Dignity.
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Introduction
When basic human rights are discussed, they are normally associated with 
the expression of high moral principles and political ideals relating to the protection 
and realization of human dignity3 and the freedoms associated with it. However, 
the generality of the term, combined with the difficulty of understanding what 
human dignity has come to mean, has created problems in understanding when a 
concrete fact is a moral practice adopted within a social group as a way of achiev-
ing this dignity or when the same fact becomes a violation of fundamental human 
rights. The problem lies in the evaluation of each concrete case because the moral 
interpretations made by each culture often diverge and may even be contradictory.
To illustrate the issue, this study examines the situation of the use of the 
burqa, a garment worn by women in some Muslim societies according to religious 
belief. The burqa covers the entire body, including the face, and has a small piece of 
mesh at eye level that allows the user to see without being seen. To some Western 
cultures, the use of this garment characterizes the degradation of women, which is 
why in countries like France it has come to be banned in public places. We observe 
how a moral practice in two different cultural contexts (one society requiring its 
use, the other forbidding it) is capable of generating antagonistic and seemingly 
irreconcilable responses, leading to a reflection on the underlying issue: whether it 
is a real violation of fundamental human rights or simply a lifestyle choice based on 
the beliefs of a culture.
The difficulty in responding to this question arises because there is still no 
clear understanding about which human rights are fundamental; there are many 
doubts about what characteristics a right must possess to be recognized as fun-
damental and to what extent rights should be universally observed or relativized 
according to the moral values adopted by each society. This theoretical gap hin-
ders the resolution of practical issues such as the burqa question and justifies the 
need for research on the epistemology of fundamental human rights as a way of 
3 In this work, the term human dignity is used to provide an abstract representation of an attribute given to 
humankind as a whole, thereby avoiding the use of the term dignity of the human person, which is associated 
with the attribute of an individual person. This is the same distinction made by Sarlet (2001, p. 38).
Resumo
O presente artigo propõe uma nova abordagem filosófica sobre os direitos 
humanos fundamentais buscando tornar clara a diferença entre práticas culturais 
controvertidas e violações de direitos, através de uma nova leitura sobre o 
conceito de dignidade humana desenvolvido por Immanuel Kant. Sugere-se a 
adoção de um conceito ético de direitos humanos fundamentais com o objetivo 
de reconciliar as teorias relativistas, as quais se opõem ao respeito universal desses 
direitos, com as posições universalistas, que advogam a observância incondicional 
desses direitos em todas as culturas. A composição entre essas duas posições é 
possível, usando-se a teoria de Kant, através da compreensão de que os direitos 
humanos fundamentais são uma subespécie do gênero direitos humanos, a 
qual é responsável por proteger a dignidade humana em sua dimensão básica, 
protegendo os indivíduos contra qualquer forma de objetificação ou redução 
de seu status como sujeitos de direitos. Assim, as peculiaridades morais de cada 
cultura são respeitadas e reconhecidas como formas individuais de realização 
humana, desde que não impliquem a redução do indivíduo a mero instrumento 
ou objeto.
Palavras-chave: direitos humanos fundamentais, universalismo, relativismo, 
multiculturalismo, dignidade humana.
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understanding their limits and applications, ensuring that the process of identify-
ing attributes that may or may not be recognized as fundamental rights is clear 
and objective. 
This work aims to develop this discussion by studying the philosophical and 
legal aspects of fundamental human rights with the aim of identifying an objective 
way to evaluate individual cases and distinguish cultural practice from violations 
of human dignity. To this end, we study the morphology of fundamental human 
rights and the ethical characteristics of the legal rights that make up this category. 
Based on this study, an ethical concept of fundamental human rights is formed, 
using the situation of the French government’s controversial ban on wearing a veil 
to demonstrate the usefulness of this definition for real cases.
The morphology of fundamental human rights
At the outset of the analysis of the morphology of fundamental human 
rights, it must be noted that there is no semantic agreement in the field about the 
terminology and the conceptual range of fundamental rights, a term often used 
synonymously with human rights, individual rights, public subjective rights, rights 
of man, fundamental freedoms and civil liberties4. Moreover, the term is commonly 
used to define the phenomenon of the assertion of human rights in the internal 
constitutional framework of states, which becomes confused with what most aca-
demic writers interpret as fundamental rights (Perez-Luño, 1984).
To establish the semantic agreement necessary for understanding the theo-
retical context proposed here, human rights must be understood as a genus that 
contains species: fundamental human rights and fundamental rights. Fundamental 
human rights constitute an essential standard for the implementation of human 
rights and are responsible for protecting the basic dimension of human dignity, 
which will be detailed below, while fundamental rights (Sarlet, 2001) represent the 
affirmation of human rights at the internal state level.
But why separate the categories of human rights and fundamental human 
rights? The need for this distinction lies in the fact that human rights (as a genus) 
have been formed historically (Leal, 2000) according to different standards of influ-
ence. Currently, we talk about environmental human rights, economic human rights 
and cultural human rights, among others (Lima Junior, 2001), which are imple-
mented asymmetrically within the social, economic, political and cultural limits of 
each state. This asymmetrical development shows that this category is developing 
to varying degrees, ranging from the protection of basic human needs to the most 
sophisticated forms of cultural, economic and social dignity. 
Human Rights as a Genus
To adequately understand fundamental human rights, one must first study their 
origin, or rather, the genus human rights. Numerous proposals can be found in the 
search for a definition of human rights, ranging from their association with natural 
law (Carpintero-Benitez, 1999) to their use as a minimum standard (Rawls, 2001) that 
serves to legitimize the legal systems of states and reduce pluralism among people. 
The most widespread concept, however, is that human rights constitute a set of rights 
4 The Brazilian Constitution of 1988 indiscriminately uses the terms rights and fundamental guarantees (art.5, 
§ 1), human rights (art. 4, II), individual rights and guarantees (art. 60, § 4) and constitutional rights and 
freedoms (art. 5, LXXI).
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inherent in all human beings, who possess them simply because they belong to the 
human species (Donelly, 2003). Thus, these would be inherent moral rights (Ishay, 
2004) that must be recognized in individuals without distinction and regardless of 
personal covenants or rules of law (Dias, 2006). There are also those who simplify the 
issue by asserting that human rights are those contained within the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights promulgated by the United Nations in 1948 (Pérez-Luño, 2001). 
However, the proposals listed above do not offer a satisfactory explanation 
of how one might recognize a particular right as integral to the human rights cat-
egory. This is so because these concepts are limited to the display of certain traits, 
such as those who hold them (by claiming that they are inherent rights of humans), 
their principal characteristics (by establishing that they are moral rights, above 
laws, existing independently of covenants or legal rules) and, finally, by showing 
some examples (such as rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of the UN) 
without explaining why the rights therein should be considered human rights.
The search for an objective concept for this class of rights must begin with 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations because it was the 
first instrument of human rights proclaimed by a global international organization 
(Buergenthal et al., 2002) and, for many researchers (Bobbio, 1992), represents a 
general consensus about the validity of a system of values founded on humanity. 
Note, however, that the issue in this analysis does not lie in the process of asserting 
human rights per se but in understanding why certain values were chosen to be 
included in this Declaration and what they contain is so important that they have 
been made the object of concern and proclamation by an entire community of 
states in the international domain.
The understanding of the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration re-
quires the analysis of events that occurred in the years preceding its enactment. 
In the period from 1940 to 1945, the Second World War left humanity with the 
experience of the cruelty of the Nazi concentration camps and the devastating ef-
fect of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Hobsbawm, 2006). Facing 
the crisis created in the social, political and economic spheres at the end of this 
devastating period, nations understood the need to create an international force 
to maintain peace and respect for human life (Chacon and Cruz, 2005). Thus, there 
was a search for the development of a joint declaration on the rights of man that 
would be capable of reconciling and inspiring respect for humanity and, at the same 
time, would be broad enough to be understood and adapted by the peoples of the 
world, taking into account their different cultures (Rodley, 2002). In 1947, during 
the preparations for the drafting of this document, UNESCO sent a questionnaire 
with considerations and problems of both general and specialized character to the 
writers and thinkers of different nations to ascertain the moral and philosophical 
doctrines adopted by different groups, arguments which could lend theoretical 
support to the set of rights to be included in the Declaration (Croce, 2002). The 
main issue to be resolved at that time was the following: “In today’s world, what 
are the theoretical bases, the practical range and the effective guarantees of spe-
cific rights or freedoms such as the following: [...].” It proceeded to list freedom of 
conscience, religion, speech, assembly, association, locomotion, living free from all 
fear, the equality of economic, social and educational opportunities, employment, 
access to subsistence and all other rights and freedoms (Croce, 2002, p. 2). Among 
the responses received were declarations by Mahatma Gandhi, Benedetto Croce, 
Aldous Huxley, Jacques Maritain, Teilhard de Chardin, John Lewis, Harold Laski and 
Salvador de Madariaga. UNESCO (1973) attempted to synthesize these responses 
and use them as a philosophical basis for the justification and rational interpretation 
of rights that would be contained in the Declaration of Human Rights.
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However, when the questionnaire responses were returned, it became ap-
parent that the issue was more complex than the UNESCO Commission for Philo-
sophical Foundations of Human Rights could imagine. The declarations received 
and the positions taken by members of the Commission showed the division of 
opinion between those who recognized human rights as natural rights (inherent 
in human beings and above society and its laws) and those who saw human rights 
as a result of a variable and relative historical process, depending on the cultural 
context adopted by each society (Barreto, 2010). According to Jacques Maritain, 
the ambassador who headed the French delegation in this discussion, the difficulty 
experienced by the Commission at the time was this ideological rivalry, which was 
so irreconcilable that at times there was agreement among all parties on the list of 
rights that should be recognized as human rights, yet with no consensus on why 
these rights should be recognized as belonging to this category (Unesco, 1973). 
These difficulties led Maritain to say that only when they could go beyond a mere 
enumeration of rights to key values that could be substantiated and could establish 
a practical criterion for use would they be able to ensure respect for this category 
(Unesco, 1973). 
Despite all the difficulties, the Commission of UNESCO achieved consensus on 
at least one element that should be the basis and measure for all rights with a claim 
to be recognized as human rights, which was incorporated in the first paragraph 
of the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1998, p. 23) and 
recognized explicitly that “[...] dignity inherent in all members of the human fam-
ily and their equal and inalienable rights constitutes the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace in the world.” Thus, human dignity became the foundation, the 
base and the theoretical justification of freedom, justice and peace in the world, 
serving as the cornerstone of the 30 articles included in that international pact. 
However, with the recognition of human dignity as the basis of human rights, the 
problem of its definition arose. At the time the UN Declaration was drafted, this 
fact led Benedetto Croce to advocate the need for holding a formal, international 
and public debate within which logic, culture and belief would contribute to an 
agreement on the principles that would be used as the foundation of human dignity 
(Unesco, 1973). Although this debate may have occurred in part during meetings 
of the UNESCO Commission for Philosophical Foundations of Human Rights, the 
clash of different moralities brought to the discussion prevented the participants 
from reaching an agreement that could lead to the establishment of a values-based 
definition capable of elucidating what constituted human dignity. Consequently, 
human rights remain without a clear foundation in the Universal Declaration. As 
a result, the rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration were listed generically, 
awaiting, as Maritain stated (Unesco, 1973), a future construction of key values 
capable of ensuring their understanding and application.
This generality in the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
has caused serious problems in applying them to concrete cases. Take the example 
of the situation of Muslim women who wear the burqa. This attire was used in 
ancient times in the region in which Afghanistan and Pakistan are now situated 
(Heath, 2008) so that the noble monarchs would not be seen by commoners (Kahf, 
2008). During the Taliban regime (1992-2001), however, the dress became popular 
and became mandatory in public under the premise that the books and sacred 
texts of Islam (the Quran, Hadith and Sunnah) required men and women to dress 
and behave modestly in public (Lyon and Spini, 2004). The controversy surrounding 
this cultural practice lies in the fact that for some Western cultures it represents a 
degradation of the dignity of women, relegating women to the role of objects and 
violating a fundamental human right (Tarlo, 2010). On the other hand, wearers of 
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the artifact claim that it is a part of their cultural expression and that they do not 
feel diminished by the cultural imposition of this moral conduct. By contrast, they 
feel protected by it and point to women in bikinis in Western beer commercials as 
a real example of reducing women to mere objects of desire (Ali, 2010). The argu-
ments presented by both supporters and opponents of the use of the burqa create 
doubt as to whether this practice is simply a cultural expression of a society’s way 
of realizing the human dignity of its members in accordance with its moral prin-
ciples or instead embodies a subtle instrument of violation of the human dignity 
by lowering the status of women.
In some Western societies, such as France, wearing the veil is seen as a viola-
tion of fundamental human rights, and its use has been banned in public places 
and accepted only in places of worship (Law No. 524 of 13 July 2010) (Jurist Legal 
News, 2010a). The polarity of French culture on the subject is so strong that the 
law governing the matter states that offenders should receive a fine of 150 Euros or 
compulsory attendance in citizenship classes (Jurist Legal News, 2010c). According 
to the French Constitutional Court, which was brought in formally to rule on the 
matter during a law suit regarding alleged unconstitutionality, the justification for 
such rigidity lies in the fact that this is a way of ensuring gender equality for the 
generation of young Muslim women living in France who are forced by their fami-
lies to wear the burqa (França, 2010). The attitude of the French Government led 
Muslim women in France to protest, arguing that the law is a form of discrimination 
and disrespect for their culture and that they want the right to choose, even if their 
choice would be to wear the burqa (The New York Times, 2011). The situation has 
created tension because Islam is the second-largest religion in France in terms of 
practicing members, who represent almost 10% (ten percent) of the population (that 
is, approximately 6 [six] million people), consisting mostly of immigrants from former 
French colonies in Africa such as Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco (BBCNews, 2010).
There is no clear explanation in the UN Declaration that dictates whether 
wearing the veil or its ban is a violation of human rights. The problem lies in the 
fact that both the Commission that drafted the Declaration and the scholars who 
advocated the universality of this category attempted to create a foundation based 
on a universal morality, which has been regarded by many cultures as an attempt 
to impose a cultural imperialism (Souza and Kretschmann, 2003).
The solution to this impasse does not lie, therefore, in an attempt to create a 
universal morality, but in the use of a theoretical tool that allows a dialogue between 
different moralities. After that, one can extract the points of contact that can be 
used as the foundation of human rights. At that point, the use of ethics stands out 
as the most feasible alternative by which to establish this dialogue and overcome the 
moral barriers that have impeded the realization of human rights (Saldaña, 1999). 
This choice is justified by the fact that ethics is a branch of philosophy, the purpose 
of which is the study of moral values. Moral values are the raw material of human 
rights (Shestack, 2000) because they guide the implementation of human dignity 
in every social group. Moreover, this statement challenges us to understand how 
we could develop ethical arguments to conceptualize human rights in the face of 
moral diversity in contemporary society.
This apparent obstacle is overcome by making a clear distinction between 
“ethics” and “morals” and by understanding the connotation of the ethical foun-
dation in this conceptual construct. Ethics, as an area of philosophy, is the science 
of human conduct (Aristotle, 2007) and human actions (Bittar, 2004). Morality, in 
turn, is the object of the study of ethics. It is characterized as the set of rules of 
conduct or customs that are adopted by a particular social group (Nalini, 1999). 
In this context, ethics are used to discuss the various moralities in an attempt to 
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establish a broader sense of human behavior and to draw from the moral facts their 
common fundamentals (Guisán, 1995). 
As an example of this heterogeneity, we may cite Christian, Jewish and Islamic 
moralities, among others, which establish in different ways the values used as guide-
lines of conduct for the societies that adopt them. Within this axiological diversity, 
it is the responsibility of ethics to work on the various moralities, finding points of 
connection and contact between them, composing and preparing their critiques.
In all such situations, the use of ethical reasoning proves to be the most suit-
able tool for establishing a definition of human rights (Bidart Campos, 1993), because 
its capacity to engage with various moralities facilitates an intercultural approach 
and the establishment of values that form the conceptual core of this category of 
rights, thus removing the risk of its inapplicability in certain cultural contexts.
Human Dignity as the Ethical Basis of Human Rights
The formulation of an ethical definition of human rights must begin by 
identifying the core element that forms this class of rights and seeking the ethical 
value common to all rights that are qualified as and elevated to the category of 
human rights. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognized in the first paragraph 
of its preamble an ethical value to be used as the basis of all rights enshrined there, 
namely human dignity. Similarly, the various theories that attempt to justify human 
rights (Baez and Barretto, 2007) assert, through different arguments and routes, that 
these rights are ways of realizing human dignity, emphasizing that this is the core 
ethical element of this class of rights (Fernandez, 1991) because they are rooted in 
the intrinsic value of the dignity found in human beings (Flood, 1998).
According to Kant (1980), human dignity is a congenital and inalienable qual-
ity in all human beings that prevents their objectification. It is embodied through 
the capacity for self-determination that individuals possess by virtue of reason. This 
quality, however, is also recognized in individuals lacking self-generating conditions, 
such as young children and people suffering from mental problems, because they 
also have the right to a dignified treatment (Dworkin, 2003). According to these 
characteristics, human dignity does not depend on legal recognition (Martinez, 
1996), since it is an inherent and ethical right placed above cultural specificities 
and their various morals and because it has the ability to persist even in those so-
cieties that do not respect it. Its violation is an affront to the capacity for human 
self-determination and to the condition of being free. 
On the other hand, authors such as Croce (2002) and Pérez-Luño (1984) 
consider the concept of human dignity to be expanding and variable because they 
understand it as inherent in every historical moment and directed by external hu-
man needs for the moral values adopted by each society.
The works of Kant, Croce and Pérez-Luño demonstrate that human dignity 
is best understood when divided into two levels. The first level, which is called the 
basic dimension in this work, is where Kant’s theory applies and where the basic 
legal rights essential to human existence are found—rights that ensure the exercise 
of each individual’s self-determination and prevent his or her objectification. The 
second level, which is called the cultural dimension in this study, encompasses the 
theories of Croce and Pérez-Luño. This dimension contains the values that vary 
across time and space and that seek to meet the social demands of each era, in 
every society, in accordance with their economic, political and cultural capabilities.
On the basis of these premises, one can see that the basic dimension of human 
dignity is an inherent quality of the individual that demands respect for life, liberty 
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and physical and moral integrity as the basic rights that prevent the objectification 
of the human being (Sarlet, 2005). Its violation is easily detected in any situation 
where a person may suffer a reduction of his or her status from a human with 
rights to a mere instrument or thing that is no longer an end in him or herself.
The cultural dimension, in turn, represents the ways and conditions in which 
human dignity, in its basic dimension, has been implemented by every social group 
throughout history. At this level of analysis, space is opened up for cultural peculiari-
ties and practices that vary across time and space, seeking an ethical understanding 
of the goals of each social group to construct meanings that can be understood 
cross-culturally (Hoffe, 2005).
Having acknowledged human dignity and its relation to human rights, one 
can say that human rights (genus) are a set of ethical values, positive or otherwise, 
that aim to achieve human dignity in two dimensions: basic (protecting individu-
als against any form of objectification or reduction of their status as humans with 
rights) and cultural (protecting moral diversity, represented by different forms as 
each society implements the basic level of human dignity).
The concept associates human rights with a set of ethical values to allow 
a philosophical discussion of the different existing moralities and to extract from 
them common foundations to serve as a cultural approach that, while demanding 
respect for universal values protected by these rights through the observance of the 
basic dimension of human dignity, preserves the moral peculiarities of each social 
group in the development of the cultural dimension of this dignity. 
The proposed definition does not attempt to cover legal or moral details 
in order to avoid the risk of becoming inapplicable in certain cultural or legisla-
tive contexts. Any attempt to conceptualize human rights through the choice of 
certain moral values would result in a relativization of this category because the 
construction of a uniquely valid or absolute morality is difficult to achieve in the 
contemporary multicultural context. The definition also omits reference to any 
rule of law because human rights are supra-legal; that is, they are independent 
of juridical recognition by laws or treaties. Take, for example, freedom, which is 
regarded in many cultures and in the UN Declaration as belonging to the class of 
human rights. According to the concept proposed in this work, we can conclude 
that freedom was recognized as a human right to protect the basic dimension of 
human dignity because it aims to avoid the objectification of individuals, providing 
them with free movement and expression of thought and belief, among others. 
Imagine a hypothetical society that did not recognize freedom within its legal system 
and that allowed slavery. Although under the legal procedure of this social group 
there would be no violation of the established normative order, there would be a 
violation of human rights because the basic dimension of human dignity was not 
achieved: people’s status as human beings would be diminished, and they would 
become mere objects of someone else’s will.
Thus, we see that the concept proposed here suggests a method for analyz-
ing each concrete case, which facilitates the process of identifying human rights by 
the following parameter: a right is only human when it contains ethical values that 
represent ways of achieving human dignity, whether in the basic dimension or in 
the cultural dimension. This conclusion is confirmed by an analysis of the preamble 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 30 articles included in it. 
The preamble contains the explicit recognition that the rights set forth therein are 
based on human dignity. Additionally, an individual analysis of each of the articles 
shows that they all represent ethical values chosen and recognized as human rights 
because they represent forms of realizing human dignity (Baez, 2010).
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Fundamental Human Rights as a species 
of Human Rights
Within the genus human rights is the category fundamental human rights, 
which should be understood as a set of ethical values, positive or negative, intended 
to protect the basic dimension of human dignity. The use of this expression seems 
appropriate because this is the dimension that contains the list of basic, essential 
and fundamental legal rights that should be shared by all members of the human 
species in equal measure without objection (Flores, 2009). Thus, we see that this 
basic right is characterized as the minimum foundation required for each society to 
build the other dimensions of human rights, which represent the different cultural 
forms of realizing human dignity.
It should be noted that this distinction between human rights and funda-
mental human rights is not intended to relativize the other dimensions of human 
rights, but to uphold the universal basic set of rights that represents the fundamental 
assertion of human rights. Once implemented and respected, this can serve as the 
basis for the specification of cultural dignity according to the peculiarities of each 
group. It is therefore at this level of human rights that the necessary theoretical 
basis for the universal application of human rights, so desperately sought by the 
international community in recent decades5, may be formed without the risk of 
relativization because of cultural specificities.
The ethical concept of fundamental human rights as 
a tool for resolving specific cases: the controversy of 
wearing the veil
We return to the issue of the veil in order to better understand how the 
ethical concept of fundamental human rights can help in solving concrete cases. 
The burqa is currently adopted in some Muslim societies based on the moral 
foundation of religion (Lyon and Spini, 2004). Its use, however, is not confined 
to a limited number of countries in the Middle East; according to the Pew Forum 
on Religion & Public Life (2010-2030), 23.4% of the world’s population is Muslim. 
Therefore, out of the 6.8 billion current inhabitants of this planet, over 1.6 bil-
lion people across the world adopt Muslim beliefs. For certain western groups, 
however, wearing the veil is seen as a sign of the exclusion and degradation of 
women and as incompatible with human dignity (The Guardian, 2011). In France, 
for example, the wearing of the veil was banned in public places by Law No. 524 
of July 13, 2010 (Jurist Legal News, 2010a). In the same year, the Senate of Spain 
approved a motion urging the government to prohibit the wearing of veils that 
cover the entire face in public places (Jurist Legal News, 2010b). In April 2010, the 
Belgian House of Representatives voted to pass a law that would ban the burqa 
and other veils covering the face in public places (Belgium, s.d.). In May 2010, 
in Quebec, Canada, a discussion was begun about Bill No. 94, which contains a 
proposal to force Muslim women to remove the veil from their faces as a condition 
for receiving some public services (CBCNEWS, 2010). Around this time, the Vice-
5 Since the end of the Second World War, an international effort has aimed to establish a minimum set of 
rights relating to human dignity that can be applied to all human beings. Evidence of this effort can be found 
by examining the declarations and international pacts that emerged from 1948 to 1966: Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Social Rights and the International Covenant on Civil Rights.
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President of the European Parliament, Silvana Koch-Mehrin, publicly expressed her 
full support for the ban of the burqa in all countries of the European continent 
(Juris Legal News, 2010b). 
The wearing of the veil is open to diverse meanings depending on the 
cultural context in which it is analyzed, a fact that has led to conflicting interpre-
tations of its relationship to the human dignity of women. This moral disagree-
ment has occurred mostly because the cultures involved attempt to judge each 
other’s practices using their own value criteria when, in fact, the only way to 
fairly assess a social behavior is by using the native values-based environment 
in which it exists.
When analyzing the issue of the burqa in terms of the two dimensions of 
human dignity set out in this work, we see that in the basic dimension wearing 
the veil can only be considered a violation of basic human rights if it significantly 
reduces the status of the person using it, leading to that person’s treatment as a 
mere instrument or object. In this respect, both the imposition of wearing the veil 
as well as the banning of it embody violations because both positions ignore the 
rights of women as individuals with their own wishes and the ability to exercise their 
right to belief and choice. When a culture imposes physical, moral or legal sanc-
tions upon a woman who wears this garment, it reduces her to a mere instrument 
(object) of the will of others, in violation of the right inherent in all human beings 
that protects them from being treated as objects. Moreover, the ban on wearing 
the veil also embodies the degradation of women as humans with rights because it 
prevents them from exercising their freedom of belief and choice by treating them 
as incapable of deciding for themselves the kind of life they want to adopt in the 
pursuit of happiness and fulfillment. 
Regarding the analysis of the situation from the aspect of the cultural dimen-
sion of human dignity, once the woman’s right (fundamental human right) to choose 
whether or not to wear the burqa is respected, this practice can be recognized as an 
expression of the cultural identities adopted by each society. This is possible because 
this choice represents the free adoption of certain moral values that the wearer of 
the burqa, together with the group in which she lives, chooses for her personal 
development. Note that at this level of analysis cultural peculiarities and practices 
are respected because one is seeking an ethical understanding of the purposes of 
each social group without value judgments about the best way to value women or 
make them happier, concepts that are by nature relative. Thus, the woman’s dignity 
is respected, in its basic dimension, and represented by her right to choose. The 
way she chooses to achieve this dignity is preserved according to the moral values 
that she elects to follow.
Thus, we conclude that the position taken by France to ban the use of 
the burqa in public places, based solely on moral values embraced by that so-
ciety, embodies the attempt to impose a moral/cultural imperialism with total 
disregard for the beliefs and axioms of women who see wearing the veil as a 
way to maintain their dignity. The desire displayed by the French government 
to choose what is right, valid and good for women in its territory based solely 
and exclusively on a set of morals adopted by most of its nationals represents 
a flagrant violation of human dignity and a disrespect for cultural diversity. The 
fact is that this prohibition does not take into account that the women who 
wear the burqa out of conviction, and who are treated, in this case, as mere 
objects, have feelings, desires, dreams and beliefs that must be understood and 
respected. In this regard, we believe that the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights explicitly recognizes the right to freedom of religion or belief and its 
public manifestation (United Nations, 1948).
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Final considerations
From the perspective of fundamental human rights, the debate over the ban 
on wearing the veil shows the clash between the desire for universal observance of 
this class of rights, which has been sought since the proclamation of the Universal 
Declaration of the UN, and the relativization applied by certain societies that argue 
for their adaptation to the moral practices they adopt.
The situation of Muslim women in France is just one example among many 
others that can be seen daily in the media, where one culture tries to impose a 
moral view upon another by using the banner of fundamental human rights to 
justify this practice. Note that the texts of international treaties expressly recognize 
the freedom of religion and belief, as well as their respective means of externaliza-
tion, as a form of expression of human dignity. However, the absence of a clear 
and objective foundation for how these rights should be interpreted has led the 
French government to see the dress worn by Muslim women as contrary to the 
moral concept of human dignity. Thus, in its territory, the government has banned 
the public expression of religious beliefs by these women through the banning of 
the use of the burqa and other veils that cover the face.
As shown in this work, these controversial situations have occurred due 
to the absence of an understanding of what constitutes fundamental human 
rights. This is because the concepts developed thus far regarding the general-
ization of the texts of international treaties do not clarify the parameters that 
must be used to identify a right as being human or to find out how these rights 
must be interpreted.
The theory presented in this study proposes the use of ethics and their abil-
ity to engage with the various moralities as a tool to conceptualize and build a 
parameter for the identification and interpretation of human rights. In this regard, 
this work suggests, both through the analysis of the various theories on the subject 
and of the wording of the preamble of the UN Declaration, that a right may only be 
considered human when it is based on the realization of human dignity in at least 
one of its dimensions: basic, protecting individuals against any form of objectifica-
tion or reduction of their status as humans with rights, and cultural, respecting the 
moral forms chosen by each society to implement this dignity. 
Thus, when faced with concrete cases such as the ban on wearing the veil in 
France, any moral benchmarks are replaced by an objective and ethical analysis of 
facts verifying whether the assessed circumstances imply the degradation of the 
individuals involved to mere objects, devoid of a will of their own. If this degrada-
tion is present in the case studied, it is a clear case of violation of fundamental 
human rights. If the practices evaluated, although controversial and incompatible 
with certain moral readings, do not bring about this degradation, then respect 
for individuals as humans with rights who are free to follow their beliefs must be 
protected as a cultural expression of human dignity.
If the French government simply prohibited Muslim women within its ter-
ritory from being forced to wear the burqa, the conclusion would be different. 
In this case, there would be a clear respect for the fundamental human right to 
freedom of choice. The choice of clothing would be seen as a different realization 
of the dignity of these women according to the beliefs they have freely chosen to 
govern their lives.
Thus, the theory proposed here allows an objective assessment of individual 
cases that reconciles relativistic theories with universal ones as it pursues the uni-
versal protection of the basic dimension of human dignity while simultaneously 
respecting the moral differences adopted by each society.
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